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Abstract
This paper provides a unique comparison between French and Portuguese local
governments with respect to the nature and determinants of budget forecast errors.
It starts by documenting and comparing their statistical properties. The results
point at biased and inefficient budget forecasts, which seem to have been more cau-
tious in French departments than in Portuguese municipalities. Second, we examine
the political, institutional and economic determinants of forecast biases. Overall,
we find that they are essentially driven by electoral motivations and by institu-
tional differences across the two countries. In particular, opportunistic forecasting
is more prevalent where governments enjoy greater margin of maneuver, and there
is evidence of conservatism in French departments where fiscal autonomy is greater.
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This paper assesses the reliability of budget forecasts presented by local governments in
France and Portugal, comparing the expenditures and revenues predicted (forecasted) in
the approved local budgets for the upcoming year with the values that materialized. It
addresses two main empirical questions regarding budget forecast errors: (1) Are budget
forecasts systematically biased at the local level, and to what extent? (2) How do political
and institutional factors influence these biases?
The analysis of budget forecasts is motivated by the key role that they play in eco-
nomic policy. In fact, revenue forecasts are an important input in the design of fiscal
policy (Auerbach, 1999), and revenue overestimation can lead to shortcuts in the pro-
vision of public goods. For instance, in the context of French departments which are
responsible of welfare assistance, overoptimistic budget forecasts could result in welfare
losses. More generally, regarding the sound public finances debate, Jonung et al. (2006)
show that budget forecast errors have contributed to the increase of structural deficits in
the European Union countries. Repeated overestimation of revenues and/or underesti-
mation of expenditures at the local level could result in considerable debt accumulation,
whose burden would decrease the funds available for the provision of public goods, with
a negative impact on local welfare.
By selecting two countries with different institutional structures, we are able to ana-
lyze the impact of institutions on budget forecast errors at the local level. For instance,
French departmental presidents and Portuguese mayors have different degrees of auton-
omy regarding the management of local finances, the capacity to approve their budgets
without having to negotiate with opposition parties, and only Portuguese mayors face a
limitation on the number of consecutive terms in office. Moreover, at the country level,
and in a recent contribution, Giuriato et al. (2016) find that the forecasting bias is more
effectively countered in presidential and semi/presidential systems, in parliamentary sys-
tems with strong bicameralism, and when executive/legislature relations are constrained
by checks and balances. In this paper, we take this analysis to the local level by arguing
that the political system of French departments can be compared to majoritarian parlia-
mentarism, while the Portuguese municipalities’ system can be seen as presidentialism.
The comparative perspective adopted in this paper allows us to check how the above-
described institutional differences impact on budget forecast performance. Additionally,
we investigate if the electoral cycle affects budget forecasting differently in these two coun-
tries, and discuss how differences in the degree of electoral opportunism may result from
different institutional settings.
Another relevant contribution of this paper to the literature is that, unlike previous
comparative studies, it is concerned with local governments and their disaggregated fiscal
data (total revenue and total expenditure, as well as their components). Existing compar-
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ative studies analyze forecasting errors of international organizations (e.g., Dreher et al.,
2008, for the International Monetary Fund), errors for EU countries (Pina and Venes,
2011) or OECD countries (Jochimsen and Lehmann, 2017), and/or mainly focus on the
consequences of forecast errors for the budget balance. Although Benito et al. (2015)
look at disaggregated revenues and expenditures data, they do it within a single country
(Spain). Here, we are mainly interested in the political and institutional determinants
of local governments’ budget forecast errors. This is important because of the relevant
role subnational governments play in the provision of public goods, and because high
and persistent forecasts errors may endanger that provision, thus negatively impacting
welfare. Moreover, the uncertainty or the variability associated with some specific bud-
get components may be different from that of budget aggregates, which calls for a more
detailed analysis of forecasts than those available panel country studies. In addition, we
distinguish between current and capital components of the budget in order to capture
possible opportunistic expenditure/revenue composition manipulations close to elections
(Rogoff, 1990).
The empirical questions presented above are at the core of the literature on the political
economy of fiscal forecasting. Previously, scholars have focused on the unintentional
sources of forecast errors, such as technical and calculation limitations, data availability,
among others (Leal et al., 2008). But, many studies on fiscal performance have recently
began to tackle systematically the issue of how differences in political and institutional
conditions affect the quality of fiscal forecasts (Brück and Stephan, 2006; Boylan, 2008;
Bischoff and Gohout, 2010; Buettner and Kauder, 2010; Chatagny, 2015; Buettner and
Kauder, 2015; Benito et al., 2015; Giuriato et al., 2016). Most of these studies focus
on either the influence of electoral business cycles (Brück and Stephan, 2006; Boylan,
2008; Cimadomo, 2016; Kauder et al., 2017) or partisan politics (Bretschneider et al.,
1989; Mocan and Azad, 1995; Paleologou, 2005; Heinemann, 2006; Chatagny, 2015).
Other papers look at institutional and organizational factors (Buettner and Kauder, 2010;
Giuriato et al., 2016). Most papers analyze the behavior of central governments and
very few focus on local authorities, particularly in Europe (exceptions being Goeminne
et al., 2008; Sedmihradská and C̆abla, 2013; Galinski, 2013; and Benito et al., 2015).1
Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, no study has tested a possible impact of fiscal
decentralization on budget forecast errors.
Consequently, our paper aims at extending the existing literature in two ways. First,
by studying the link between fiscal decentralization and forecast cycles. Second, by adopt-
ing a comparative perspective which uses data for French departments and Portuguese
municipalities. The focus of our analysis is, not only to characterize fiscal forecasting
accuracy in these countries, but also to ascertain if and how forecasts at the local level
1At the sub-national level, many studies come out of North America (Feenberg et al., 1989; Mocan
and Azad, 1995; and Boylan, 2008, among others).
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are influenced by political, economic, and institutional factors.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature and
derives the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 first describes the institutional frameworks
in which French departments and Portuguese municipalities operate. Then, it presents
the estimation model and the data used. Finally, it describes the empirical results and
their implications for the hypotheses derived in section 2. Finally, section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
This section briefly reviews the related literature and derives the main hypotheses to be
tested using a panel dataset composed of 95 French departments and 308 Portuguese
municipalities.
2.1 Opportunistic budget forecast cycles
A classical argument in political economy holds that incumbent policymakers manipulate
fiscal policy in order to increase their probability of reelection. This is the political
budget cycle (PBC) theory (see Dubois, 2016, for a survey). Analogously, Brück and
Stephan (2006) introduced the concept of “Electoral Forecast Cycle”. They argue that the
process of developing revenue forecasts and spending budgets serves as a political tool by
incumbents who seek to manage the electorate’s expectations of overall job performance,
particularly during an election cycle. For instance, it is logical to think that more promises
will be made just before elections to increase the incumbent’s popularity among voters
(Blais and Nadeau, 1992). Likewise, Heinemann (2006) considers that under the vote
or popularity maximization assumption, the government might be tempted to use non-
binding financial planning as a marketing instrument for depicting a bright fiscal future
in order to gain political support.
Information asymmetries between the government and voters on the fiscal future do
clearly exist. The consequence is that the government has a certain leeway to cheat
voters. Indeed, the lack of transparency in the budgetary process enables politicians
to strategically manipulate fiscal forecasts. Thus, politicians can have incentives to be
optimistic or pessimistic (Goeminne et al., 2008; Chatagny and Soguel, 2012). First,
optimism over revenue (overestimation) allows governments to provide increased services
without an immediate increase in taxes, or to satisfy a balanced-budget requirement. In
addition, optimistic revenue forecasts carry a lower political cost in terms of potential loss
of votes than tax increases. Second, pessimistic revenue forecasts (underestimation) may
provide a cushion for unanticipated expenditures or revenue shortages, and show that
prudent management results in year-end operating savings (Benito et al., 2015).
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In line with the insights on voting cycles, a particularly optimistic assessment of the
budgetary future is to be expected before an election. Generally, this leads to budget
deficits.2 We then hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: The government tends to underestimate expenditure and
overestimate revenue for the election years.
2.2 Fiscal autonomy and budget forecasts
This paper relates also to the literature on the political economy of fiscal decentraliza-
tion (Joanis, 2014; Bröthaler and Getzner, 2011; González et al., 2013). We put forward
the concept of fiscal autonomy in order to link it to budget forecast bias. Fiscal auton-
omy of sub-national governments is understood as a gradual range of decision power on
own resources and expenditure. Own taxes represent the highest degree of sub-national
autonomy. Shared taxes, which are distributed between the levels and units of public
authorities, represent a middle degree of autonomy (Bröthaler and Getzner, 2011).
From a theoretical viewpoint, more control over a policy instrument implies more
accountability. In fact, decentralization alters the government’s structure so as to increase
citizen voice and change the deep incentives that politicians face. Recently, scholars
examined the possibility that, if some costs of electoral fiscal manipulation could be
shifted outside the jurisdiction (e.g., to the central government), it may affect voters’
attitudes towards the manipulation and, accordingly, the tendency of local policymakers
to induce political budget cycles (Baskaran et al., 2016; Asatryan et al., 2015)
Jonung et al. (2006) show that budget forecast errors have contributed to the accu-
mulation of budget deficits. Under high fiscal autonomy, deficits are expected to lead to
higher taxes in the future. The latter have electoral costs for politicians (Brender, 2003;
Drazen and Eslava, 2010), inducing them to refrain from opportunistic budgeting. When
fiscal autonomy is lower, the costs of opportunistic deficits in a given circumscription are
not fully internalized by its voters, as costs will be shared with taxpayers of the rest of the
country. In such cases, opportunistic budgeting, and the resulting election-year deficits,
may actually pay off at the polls. Hence, we postulate the following:
Hypothesis 2: Greater fiscal autonomy should induce more conservatism
in budget forecasting.
2.3 Partisan budget forecast cycles
The partisan theory posits that government policies are sensitive to ideological motives
(Hibbs, 1977). Traditionally, left-wing governments are expected to run more expansion-
2However, recurrent deficits suggest nonfeasance and incompetence on the part of those charged with
financial management. Thus, governments may want to register compensating surpluses in non-election
years. According to Larkey and Smith (1989), greater optimism is expected in election years because
revenue increases and expenditure cuts cost votes.
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ary policies than right-wing incumbents. Thus, they may also be more willing to run
deficits. Following this literature, Heinemann (2006) suggests that the government might
use financial projections as a strategic tool to influence budgetary processes according
to its ideological view on the future of the government. A left-wing government with a
preference for the expansion of the public sector may consciously depict a particularly
optimistic picture about the future of public finances. By doing so, it might hope to
convince the public that a present expansion can be financed. A right-wing government,
with opposite preferences, would depict a particularly gloomy picture of the fiscal future,
as a way to lobby for budgetary cuts. Based on the preceding arguments, we formulate
our third hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Left-wing governments tend to produce positive markups on
budgeted revenues when compared to right-wing governments. The opposite
holds for expenditures.
2.4 Reelection probability and strategic budgeting
Aidt et al. (2011) investigate theoretically and empirically the interaction between the
incentive to generate political budget cycles and electoral competition. Extending the
Rogoff (1990) model, these authors show that when a close election race is expected, the
incumbent’s incentive to manipulate fiscal policy for electoral gain intensifies, thereby
increasing the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion.
In the context of budget forecasting, opportunistic behavior leads to biased budgets.
According to Bischoff and Gohout (2010), biased tax projections can help the incumbent
party in its struggle for reelection. Higher expenditures and/or lower taxes have a pos-
itive effect on the incumbent’s popularity as they may result in short-term increases in
employment and output, and can be targeted to important groups of voters or interest
groups, as a way to gain votes and support. Thus, incumbents may want to overstate
budgets for election years (Hypothesis 1).
But how do incumbent policymakers behave when they expect to be defeated? In
that case, they may have an incentive to use debt strategically. By raising debt prior to
elections to an inefficiently high level, the incumbent can afford more spending programs
or tax cuts and, at the same time, limit the scope of action of the following govern-
ment (Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). Thus, incumbents who face a low probability of
reelection have an incentive to overestimate fiscal revenues. The “stubborn conservative
government hypothesis” (Persson and Svensson, 1989) would have similar implications
for right-wing incumbents, but not for left-wing ones. While right-wing parties want to
prevent their left-wing successors from increasing public expenditures in areas which the
conservatives consider unnecessary or even harmful (see also Pettersson-Lidblom, 2001),
left-wing incumbents, who have a preference for larger governments, may prefer to leave
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more resources for their right-wing successors. On the other hand, Hibbs (1977) argues
that left-wing governments are more willing to run (open or hidden) deficits because
their constituents benefit more from possible reductions in the unemployment rate than
they are harmed by the negative impact of higher deficits on inflation. Thus, biased tax
projections may be used by both left- and right-wing governments.
According to Bischoff and Gohout (2010), as reelection is never certain, the incentive
to bring forward extra expenditures or cut taxes exists in all years of government. The
negative impact of overstated tax projections for non-election years creates incentives to
overstate tax projections less for non-election years than for election years. Nevertheless,
they may remain positive, especially if the incumbent is currently unpopular.
Taking into account the arguments above, and considering that Aidt et al. (2011) show
that Portuguese mayors increase the opportunistic distortion in local finances when the
expected win margin is smaller, we hypothesize that opportunistic budget bias will be
higher when the probability of reelection is lower.
Hypothesis 4: Lower probability of reelection leads to higher opportunistic
budget forecast bias.
3 Empirical setting
This section briefly describes the institutional framework in which French departments
and Portuguese municipalities operate, presents the empirical model, and describes the
data used in the paper.
3.1 Institutional framework
Institutions determine the rules in a society and shape the incentives of policymakers
and voters. Therefore, institutional differences between the two countries considered in
this paper may help explain differences in results regarding the determinants of budget
forecast biases. Mainly for readers not familiar with local governments in France and/or
Portugal, we provide in this section a brief description of the institutional frameworks in
which French departments and Portuguese municipalities operate.
3.1.1 French departments
The French institutional setting is a four-tier system comprising the central government,
18 regions, 101 departments, and about 36,000 municipalities. In this study we focus on
metropolitan France which is divided into 96 departments. A department is composed of
several counties (cantons) and of several constituencies (circonscriptions). In constituen-
cies, voters elect their representatives at the National Assembly and, in counties, voters
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elect their representatives at the General Council.3
The councilors are nominated trough democratic elections for six years. Before 2013,
these elections took place once every three years (generally in March) in which half of the
departmental council was elected in each department. In the context of a multi-party-
system, a two-round majority vote is used. To be elected in the first round, a candidate
must get at least half of the votes plus one, and a number of votes equal to at least 25%
of the registered voters. To be a candidate in the second round, it is necessary to have
obtained in the first round a number of votes equal to at least 10% of the registered voters.
However, if only one candidate clears this threshold, the one ranked second can remain
a candidate. The candidate who gets the biggest number of votes in the second round is
elected. After every election, the departmental council elects a president. Since 2013, the
electoral rule has changed, to a bi-nominal majority vote with two rounds. Every county
is represented by a “twin-ticket” (“binôme” in French) of a man and a woman, and the
whole departmental council is to be elected every six years. To be elected in the first
round, the binôme must obtain at least half of the votes plus one, and a number of votes
equal to at least 25 per cent of the registered voters. If a second round is necessary, all
the binômes with at least 12.5% of registered voters can compete. The reelection rule is
as in the previous paragraph.
The decentralization Act of 1982 (and afterwards the Act of 2003) provided the de-
partmental council with new competencies and a relative autonomy. The President of
the departmental Council prepares and implements the department’s budget. The de-
partmental resources rely in part on central government transfers (about 40%) and on
own resources such as local taxes. In terms of competencies, French departments are
responsible for the management of a number of social and welfare allowances, of junior
high school (collège) buildings and technical staff, of local roads, school and rural buses,
and for a contribution to municipal infrastructures.
For the elaboration of budget forecasts, the ministry of finance provides departmental
councils the macroeconomic forecasts. On this basis and given their needs, departments
set their own tax rates on a common tax base for a large range of local direct taxes.
Budgets are prepared by the president of council with the help of a technical staff. Before
being enacted, the budget has to be voted by the council.
3.1.2 Portuguese municipalities
The Portuguese institutional setting comprises the central government, regional govern-
ments in the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira, and 308 municipalities (278 in
the mainland, 19 in Azores and 11 in Madeira). All municipalities, regardless of location,
3Given the particularity of Paris as municipality and department, we exclude it from our analysis.
Since the reform of 2013, General Councils are renamed into departmental councils. Indeed, French
departments are governed by the departmental council.
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share the same institutional structure and are governed by the same laws and financial
regime. Municipalities are responsible for the promotion of local economic development
and territorial organization, as well as for the provision of several public goods related to
water and sewage, energy, transportation, housing, healthcare, education, culture, sports,
environmental protection and public order.
Regarding the municipal institutional structure, the representative branches of munici-
palities’ government are the Town Council (Câmara Municipal), which holds the executive
power, and the Municipal Assembly, the deliberative branch. The latter approves the gen-
eral framework for local policies and the municipal budgets and accounts, while the Town
Council is responsible for their elaboration and implementation. In the last quarter of
each year, the Town Council submits a plan of activities and a budget for approval by
the Municipal Assembly. Although the latter has the power to reject those documents,
it is not allowed to introduce amendments to them. The members of both chambers are
elected by the registered voters of each municipality for a four-year term.4 While all
members of the Town Council are elected directly by voters, half plus one of the members
of the Municipal Assembly are elected directly, and the others are the presidents of the
parishes that belong to the municipality. The leader of the most voted list for the Town
Council becomes the mayor.
Besides presiding the Town Council and choosing which executive competencies are
delegated to other elected members, the mayor has ample autonomy regarding human
resource management, authorization of contracts, and allocation of financial resources.
Additionally, the mayor’s party generally holds a majority of deputies in both the Town
Council and Municipal Assembly, making the budgets proposed by the mayor’s team
easy to approve. Although mayors have ample autonomy regarding the allocation of
resources, most municipalities have limited ability to raise own revenues and are, therefore,
dependent on transfers from the central government. Portuguese municipalities can obtain
loans, but medium to long term debt (over one year) can only be used to fund investment
expenditures. The current limit on municipal gross debt corresponds to 1.5 times the
average current revenues of the last three years.
4The elections for both chambers, and those for the parish assemblies, are concurrent and take place
in all municipalities at the same time. Voters cast their votes in party or independent closed lists, and
votes are transformed into mandates using the Hondt method, which is a highest averages method for
allocating seats. After all the votes have been tallied, the following quotient (V/(S + 1)) is calculated for
each party, where V is the total number of votes that the list received and S is the number of seats that
the party has been allocated so far (initially 0 for all parties). The party having the largest quotient gets
the first seat allocated, and its quotient is recalculated given its new seat total. The process is repeated
until all seats have been allocated. Parishes (freguesias) are subdivisions of municipalities and constitute
the lowest administrative unit in Portugal.
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3.2 Estimation model
In this subsection, we start by describing our forecasting error indicator, the error tests
to evaluate forecast accuracy, and the estimation model used in efficiency tests. Then, we
describe the empirical model used to analyze the main economic, political and institutional
determinants of budget forecast errors for a panel of French departments and Portuguese
municipalities.
3.2.1 Forecast Accuracy and Efficiency
The first step of our empirical analysis is to check the rationality of budgetary plans.
Hence, it is important to define the concept of forecast error. Generally, it is defined as
the difference between forecasted and realized values. Forecasted values for year t are
taken from the local budget for year t, approved at the end of year t − 1. The realized
values are those from the approved final accounts of year t. Let A denote the actual
revenue/expenditure and F the forecast value of the same variable. This paper uses the
following budget inaccuracy or forecasting error indicator:
PFEx,t =
(Ax,t − Fx,t) ∗ 100
Ax,t
(1)
where x is the analyzed budget segment (revenues, expenditures or a part of them),
and PFE is the Percent Forecast Error. This indicator gives information about the
direction and the extent of the bias. On the revenue side, a positive PFE corresponds to
an under-estimate or conservative forecast and a negative PFE to an optimistic forecast.
The opposite stands on the expenditure side.
We evaluate the forecasts by means of the following error tests (MPFE, MAPE):
1. The Mean Percentage Forecast Error (MPFE) measures the average of percentage
errors by which forecasts differ from outcomes. It shows whether systematic over-
or under-prediction is present. Since positive and negative forecast errors can offset







2. The Mean Absolute Percentage Forecast Error (MAPFE) measures the average per-
centage absolute difference between the forecast and the outturn. Since positive and
negative errors no longer cancel each other out, it is a more accurate measure of the








Regarding unbiasedness, these indicators should be equal to zero, otherwise forecasts
are biased.
In addition, we test for efficiency by regressing forecast errors on their twice lagged values
and current forecast values. We thus estimate the following model:
PFEi,t = λ0 + λ1PFEi,t−2 + λ2F i,t + ui,t (2)
where F denotes the forecast and ui,t being an i.i.d. residual.
Efficiency requires that budget-makers fully exploit the information available at the
time of the forecast. Conventionally, forecast efficiency implies that the deviation between
the outcome and the projection is not related to information available at the time the
projection was made (see, e.g., Keane and Runkle, 1990). Therefore, a condition for weak
efficiency is that: λ1 = λ2 = 0.5
3.2.2 Determinants of budget forecast errors
In order to test the hypotheses mentioned in section 2, we estimate a model for French
departments and Portuguese municipalities. As mentioned above, forecast errors are
related to the political and institutional characteristics of the department or municipality.
As main explanatory variables, we consider the electoral cycle (Cycle), fiscal autonomy
(Autonomy), the ideology of the incumbent government (LeftWing), and the margin of
victory of the incumbent party relative to the largest opposition party (Wm). Several
other political and economic variables are included as controls. The empirical model can
be summarized as follows:
PFEi,t = c+ ρ1PFEi,t−1 + a1Cyclei,t + a2Autonomyi,t
+ a3LeftWingi,t + a4Wm+X
′
i,tθ + γi + νt + εi,t
(3)
where PFE is the percentage forecast error,6 the main explanatory variables are as
described above (more details are given below), X is a vector of economic and financial
control variables, γi are fixed-effects covering the unobservable heterogeneity between
departments (France) or municipalities (Portugal), νt captures year fixed-effects which
are included to control for common shocks. c is a constant and εi,t is the residual. Note
5The absence of both bias and auto-correlation is sometimes called “weak form informational effi-
ciency". It is worth noting that, since forecasts for year t are produced in the fall of year t− 1, the once
lagged forecast error (PFEi,t−1) is not yet know when the forecasts are being made. For that reason, it
is not included in Equation (2).
6In order to account for the persistence in forecast errors, we include the lagged PFE as an explanatory
variable. When the second lag of PFE is included as an additional explanatory variable, it is seldom
statistically significant. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that our system-GMM models use the
second lag of PFE as an instrument for the first lag (which is endogenous).
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that equation (3) represents a test of the rationality hypothesis. The joint null hypothesis
is that all the coefficients of the right-hand side variables are equal to zero.
A large number of previous studies test for the presence of electoral bias using a
dummy variable for the election year (e.g., Larkey and Smith, 1989; Boylan, 2008; Pina
and Venes, 2011). Here, we also include a dummy for the pre-election year, as oppor-
tunistic policies may be implemented sooner, especially in France, where departmental
elections take place in the first quarter of the election year. Since Portuguese municipal
elections take place in the last quarter of the year, opportunistic policies may be imple-
mented mostly during the election year. Thus, the following two dummy variables are
included in the model: Eleci,t, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for each
election year, and zero otherwise; and Y BEleci,t, which is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 in the year before the election, and zero otherwise. According to Hypothesis
1, negative and statistically significant coefficients for revenue items would be consistent
with an opportunistic overestimation of revenues prior to elections. The inverse applies
to expenditures.
To test our second main hypothesis, we introduce the variable Autonomy to capture
the impact of fiscal autonomy on budget forecast errors. We expect this variable to have
a positive sign on the revenue side and a negative sign on the expenditure side, indicating
greater conservatism when fiscal autonomy is higher.
We include the LeftWing dummy variable in order to control for partisan effects. Left-
wing council presidents or mayors are supposed to be more optimistic, or less pessimistic,
than right-wing and independent incumbents. Thus, a negative sign is expected for the
coefficient of the variable LeftWing for PFEs in revenues, and a positive one for PFEs
in expenditures.
In order to test the reelection probability hypothesis, election polls should be taken
as independent variables. But, the lack of polls at the local level induces the usage of a
proxy. Given the persistence in the votes each party receives, prior margins of victory
may reasonably indicate how close the next elections will be. Therefore, we use the win-
margin (Wm) in the previous local elections, that is, the difference in the vote shares of the
incumbent president’s or mayor’s party and the largest opposition party. If the incumbent
president of the council (mayor) anticipates reelection, she will not have incentives to
overestimate revenues. Conversely, if she anticipates a defeat or a close race, she will have
an incentive to overestimate revenues. Thus, we expect the variable win-margin (Wm)
to have a negative sign.
In order to check if the effects of the above-referred variables differ in the two countries,
we interact them with the dummy variable PT which takes the value of 1 for Portuguese
municipalities and 0 for French departments.7 While the estimated coefficients of the
7The dummy variable PT cannot be included by itself in the model because it would be collinear
with the department/municipal fixed effects (γi).
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variables of interest indicate their impact in the case of French departments, the effects
for Portuguese municipalities are obtained by adding the estimated coefficient of the
variable of interest with that of the respective interaction with PT .
As a first control variable, we include a measure of political strength of the local
government (Majority). This dummy variable takes the value of 1 when the party of the
President/Mayor has majority in the department/municipal chamber(s), and equals zero
otherwise. As fragmentation may lead to over-optimism, its absence is expected to lead
to more conservative (pessimistic) budget forecasts. We add other political variables as
controls, such as Government party (GovParty), Terms in office (Terms), and Run for
reelection (RR). The variable GovParty is a dummy variable which takes the value of
1 if the national government is led by the party of the mayor or of the president of the
council. Terms in office is the number of consecutive mandates the incumbent has been in
office. RR is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the president of the council
or the mayor runs for a new mandate, and 0 otherwise. Coded like this, it indicates
the opposite of the lame-duck effect (Larkey and Smith, 1989). Because an incumbent
running for a new term has to worry about winning elections, her budget formulations
may be influenced by electoral considerations.
Some additional economic and demographic variables are also added as controls,
namely the unemployment rate (Unemp), regional GDP per capita growth (Rgdpg), Bud-
get stress, and population growth (Popgr). Boylan (2008) brought forward that the unem-
ployment rate plays a crucial role for the accuracy of fiscal forecasts, with states in the U.S.
overestimating tax revenue changes in times of high unemployment. Thus, a negative sign
is expected for the unemployment rate on the revenue side and a positive sign on the ex-
pense side. We use the previous year values of these variables since that is the information
local governments have at the time the budget is made. Since GDP data are not available
at the department or municipality levels, we use the regional GDP per capita growth.8 We
consider its growth as a proxy of economic expansion or recession. Thus, the coefficient of
Rgdpg should have the opposite sign to that of Unemp. In order to account for economic
crises which affected the countries, with greater incidence in Portugal, we include the
dummy variable Crisis, which takes the value of one in recession years and equals zero
in the remaining years. We use the Budget stress (Bss = Revenues−Expenditures
Revenues
∗ 100) as a
proxy of the fiscal pressure the local government faces. This variable assesses the fiscal
situation of the local government at the time that the budget was being formulated and
approved. As the fiscal condition of a government worsens (i.e., Bss values become more
negative), presidents of councils or mayors will have less leeway to underestimate budget
deficits. Population growth is another control variable we consider. It is measured as the
8For Portugal, we use regional GDP per capita at the NUTS III level. NUTS is the European Union
nomenclature for territorial statistical units. Portugal is subdivided into three NUTS I regions (Mainland,
Azores and Madeira), seven NUTS II regions, and 25 NUTS III regions. Each NUTS III region aggregates
several municipalities, which correspond to the NUTS IV level.
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year-on-year growth rate in the population. As labor force and taxpayers, the evolution
of the number of inhabitants may affect local taxes and overall total revenue and, in turn,
budget forecast errors.
The full linear dynamic panel data model can be written as:
PFEi,t = c+ ρ1PFEi,t−1 + α1Y BEleci,t + α2Y BEleci,t ∗ PT + α3Eleci,t
+ α4Eleci,t ∗ PT + α5Autonomyi,t + α6Autonomyi,t ∗ PT
+ α7LeftWingi,t + α8LeftWingi,t ∗ PT + α9Wmi,t + α10Wmi,t ∗ PT
+ α11Majorityi,t + α12RRi,t + α13Termsi,t + α14GovPartyi,t
+ α15Unempi,t−1 + α16Rgdpgi,t−1 + α17Crisisi,t−1 + α18Bssi,t−1
+ α19Popgri,t + γi + νt + εi,t
(4)
We now turn to the estimation method. Given the fact that the set of cross-sectional
units (French departments or Portuguese municipalities) is not randomly selected, a fixed
effects model would be preferable to random effects. But, equation (4) contains a lagged
dependent variable and the time dimension is short relative to the number of depart-
ments or municipalities. In this case, Nickell (1981) pointed that the lagged dependent
variable’s coefficient is biased due to the correlation between the fixed effects and the
lagged dependent variable.
Several alternative estimators were proposed to cope with this problem, such as N-
consistent Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators, with the two most popular
being the difference-GMM by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the system-GMM by Blundell
and Bond (1998). We follow the recommendations by Roodman (2009) and use the
system-GMM estimator, which is more appropriate for large-N, small-T datasets such as
ours, in which the dependent variable is persistent.
3.3 Data
For comparative purposes, this study employs two databases. The first covers 95 French
departments over the period 2004-2015. The second encompasses all 308 Portuguese
municipalities through the period 1998-2015. We restrict our analysis to these periods
because of data availability. Financial and economic variables were gathered from the Di-
rectorate General of Local Governments (France) and its equivalent in Portugal (DGAL).
Political variables come from the Ministries of Internal Affairs of both countries. These
data-sets are suitable for the purpose of this paper. First, all French departments operate
under the same institutional framework, and the same applies to Portuguese municipali-
ties. Second, the local governments decide autonomously on the projected fiscal resources
and expenses they use in the budgetary process.
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Regarding our dependent variable, we concentrate on actual and budgeted (one year
ahead) amounts for seven variables: total revenue, total expenditure, current revenue,
capital revenue, direct taxes, current expenditure, and capital expenditure. In the time
period under review, four departmental elections (2004, 2008 2011 and 2015) were held
in France and four municipal elections (2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013) in Portugal.
Concerning ideology, we include the dummy variable Left wing, which takes the value
of 1 if the president of a French departmental council belongs to a left-wing party (Parti
Socialiste, PS; Divers Gauche, DVG; Parti Radical de Gauche, PRG or Parti Communiste
Français, PCF) or if the mayor of a Portuguese municipality belongs to a left-wing party
(Partido Socialista, PS; Partido Comunista Português, PCP; or Bloco de Esquerda, BE),
and equals 0 otherwise. In the French database, the percentage of left-wing presidents
of councils is 53%, whilst the rightist represent 42%. The remaining 5% are from the
centre. Thus, on average, more left-wing presidents are present in the French data. In the
Portuguese case, there is the same pattern: also 53% of mayors are leftists, while 45% are
from the right-wing, and 2% are independent. In France, 43% of the council presidents
belong to the government party, and 76% run for reelection. The figures for Portuguese
mayors are quite similar, 42% and 75%, respectively.
Regarding the economic environment, the unemployment rate varies between 4.2%
and 16%, for a mean of 8.9% in French departments. In Portuguese municipalities, it
ranges from 0.64% to 18.29%, for a mean of 6.7% over the period under study.
As for a measure of fiscal autonomy, we consider the ratio of Direct Taxes to Total
revenue of the local entity.9 The average value of this variable is about 30.72% for French
departments and 17.44% for Portuguese municipalities. From Figure 1, it appears that, on
average, French departments rely considerably more on local taxes than Portuguese munic-
ipalities. Hypothesis 2 implies that, being more fiscally autonomous, French departments
should be more conservative in their budget forecasts than Portuguese municipalities.
9Direct taxes represent the bulk of local governments’ tax revenues (roughly 56% in French depart-
ments and 95% in Portuguese municipalities).
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Descriptive statistics of the variables for which annual data was collected are presented
in Tables A.1 and A.2 of the Online Appendix, for French departments and Portuguese
municipalities, respectively.
3.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the results of bias and efficiency tests, and of those regarding the
main economic, political and institutional determinants of budget forecast errors. The
results of robustness tests are also briefly discussed in the end of the section.
3.4.1 Bias test
To check for the presence of biases in budget forecasts, we summarize their statistical
properties in Table 1, which presents the mean values of the forecasting performance
indicator (the Percent Forecast Error, PFE, and its absolute value) and its standard
deviations in French departments and in Portuguese municipalities during the time span
considered in each country.10
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 1 shows that the executives of French departments have overestimated total and
capital revenues on average by 3.3% and 41.4%, respectively, underestimated direct taxes,
and over-forecasted all expenditure items we analyzed. Regarding Portuguese municipal-
ities, the Mean Percentage Forecast Error over the period 1998-2015 is negative for all
10We have a longer time span for Portuguese municipalities due to greater availability of budget
forecasts. However, restricting the analysis to the same period as in French departments does not change
the standing of the results.
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the budget items considered. For instance, the average PFE for total revenue (exclud-
ing loans) is −56.7% and for total expenditure it is −57.1%. Overall, there is evidence
of optimistic revenue and pessimistic expenditure forecasts in Portuguese municipalities.
Altogether, the calculations show that, on average, the forecasts of total revenue and of
the other budget components exceed actual outcomes.
We also compute the Absolute Percent Forecast Error (APFE). This indicator re-
veals the real average size of the forecast errors. For instance, total revenue and total
expenditure were over-forecasted by about 5.4% in French departments. For Portuguese
municipalities, these values are, respectively, of 57.1% and 55.2%. The standard devia-
tions (SD) of the PFE and the APFE are larger for capital revenue than for the other
budget items, which indicates that this variable may be more difficult to forecast.
On the basis of these summary statistics, we can conclude that budget forecasts are
biased in both French departments and in Portuguese municipalities. It is interesting
to notice that forecast errors are considerably lower in French departments than in Por-
tuguese municipalities. This may happen because most Portuguese mayors (81%) are
supported by majorities in the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly, which makes
budgets relatively easy to approve, even if they are somewhat unrealistic. On the con-
trary, French departmental presidents usually depend on coalition partners and may have
a harder time negotiating budgets which involve forecast manipulation. It is also possible
that larger forecast errors in Portuguese municipalities are explained by the fact that they
are, on average, considerably smaller than French departments (in terms of population
and size of the local economy), and have smaller staffs working on budget forecasts. But,
if larger forecast biases are due to lack of staff or expertise, they should not be affected
by the political cycle. As shown in the next section, this does not appear to be the case.
3.4.2 Efficiency test
We now turn to the analysis of efficiency. Tables 2 and 3 present estimates of equation 2 for
both revenue items and expenditure ones. The results indicate that the twice lagged rev-
enue PFE contributes positively to the explanation of the current revenue PFE, especially
in Portuguese municipalities. As for French departments, PFEt−2 is only statistically sig-
nificant for capital revenue and revenue from direct taxes, with a negative sign, indicating
that larger past errors contribute to smaller current ones. Regarding expenditures, past
forecast errors positively contribute to current errors in total and capital expenditures,
both in French departments and Portuguese municipalities. Overall, forecast errors are
persistent and past errors not corrected, especially in Portuguese municipalities.
The results show also that the PFE depends on the magnitude of the forecast itself.
λ2 is always statistically significant, both for French departments and Portuguese munici-
palities. Nevertheless, higher forecasts seem to imply lower mistakes, as λ2 has a negative
sign. An explanation of this result could be that higher forecasts are a matter of big
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jurisdictions which may dispose of relatively better budget staffs than small ones.
To conclude this section, we note that budget forecasts in French departments and
Portuguese municipalities are generally biased and inefficient. Thus they are inaccurate.
In a broader international comparison, such inaccuracy patterns are not uncommon, as
evidenced by previous studies (Goeminne et al., 2008 ; Chatagny, 2015). The disturbing
fact is the magnitude of the errors attained: while Goeminne et al. (2008) reported Total
revenue forecast error reaching -0.4%, the relevant French departments and Portuguese
municipalities forecasts produced respectively -3.26% and -56.73% of errors. It is then
interesting to check for the forces which drive these inaccuracies. Are these forces similar
in both countries (for instance, political, economic and demographic factors), or different
according to the institutional arrangements?
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]
3.4.3 Determinants of budget forecast errors
In this sub-section, we turn to the analysis of the estimation results regarding the de-
terminants of percentage forecast errors (PFE). The results of system-GMM estimations
for total revenues and expenditures are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, re-
spectively. All explanatory variables, except election and year dummies, were treated as
potentially endogenous. Their twice lagged levels were used as instruments in the first-
difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation.
We report two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples, as
suggested by Windmeijer (2005). The p-values of autocorrelation and Hansen tests are
reported at the end of the Table.11 The dependent variable is the percent forecast error
(PFE) as defined by equation (1). The lagged PFE is always positive and statistically
significant, indicating that forecast errors are persistent.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
One interesting feature of Table 4 is the similarity of the estimated coefficients in
the regressions for revenue and expenditure PFEs. Not only the statistically significant
variables are essentially the same, but also the signs are equal and the magnitudes of the
coefficients are not too different. This may be due to the fact that local governments
have to present balanced budgets, thus adjusting their forecasts for expenditures to the
forecasted revenues. In fact, the correlation between the PFEs for total revenues and
11The validity of the results depends on the absence of second order autocorrelation and on the
appropriateness of the instrument matrix (evaluated by the Hansen test). This is clearly the case as
the p-values of the AR(2) and Hansen tests are above 0.1. Since taking first-differences causes first
order autocorrelation, the AR(1) test should reject its absence, which is also the case. Additionally,
our model does not seem to suffer from problems of multicollinearity, as Variance Inflation Factors are
clearly within accepted values (see Table B.3 in the Online Appendix) and the correlations among the
explanatory variables are relatively low (see Table B.4).
18
expenditures is 96.9%, which is indicative of this adjustment. Therefore, our comments
will focus more on the results for revenue PFEs.
The results point at the presence of an electoral bias, both in French departments and
in Portuguese municipalities. There is evidence that presidents of departmental councils
tend to underestimate both revenues and expenditures in the year before the elections.
The coefficients for the election year are not statistically significant, eventually because
the departmental elections take place in the first quarter, which implies that only policies
implemented in the year before the election produce visible results before voters go to the
polls. As for Portuguese municipalities, the results indicate overestimation of revenues
and expenditures, both for the election year and the year before.12
Overall, these results indicate that revenue forecasts are managed opportunistically
(overestimated) in Portugal, while the opposite happens in France. This is consistent with
the fact that Portuguese mayors have larger room of maneuver than departmental presi-
dents, not only because they are generally supported by majorities in the Town Council
and in the Municipal Assembly, but also because Portuguese mayors play a more promi-
nent role in the conduct of their local governments than French departmental presidents.
Therefore, for Portuguese municipalities, the empirical evidence gives support to Hypoth-
esis 1, according to which politicians opportunistically manipulate budget forecasts in
the pre-election period. These findings also confirm those of previous studies (Brück and
Stephan, 2006; Benito et al., 2015). The opposite seems to happen for expenditures, with
evidence of underestimation in France, but not in Portugal. In Portuguese municipalities,
actual revenues in the election year and the year before are considerably lower than the
forecasts, which would lead to huge deficits if the mayors spent all that was predicted
in the budget. Thus, mayors generally spend less than the forecasted expenditures, but
more than actual revenues, ending up with a deficit in the election year, as shown by Aidt
et al. (2011). That is, Portuguese mayors manage expenditures opportunistically, even
though they tend to overestimate them in the initial budget.
The results indicate that fiscal autonomy is relevant for electoral forecasts, pushing
Presidents of departmental councils to be conservative when forecasting revenues. But, for
Portuguese mayors, fiscal autonomy does not seem to affect budget forecasts, as a Wald
test does not reject the hypothesis that the effect is zero. Overall, Hypothesis 2, which
postulates a positive link between fiscal autonomy and conservatism in revenue forecasts,
is verified in France, but not for Portugal. These results are consistent with Feld and
Baskaran (2010) who argue that more revenue autonomy may imply more responsibility.
We also check the existence of partisan effects. Given that the coefficient for left wing gov-
ernments and its interaction with the dummy for Portugal are not statistically significant,
12The coefficients of the interactions with PT are negative and larger in absolute value than those
for the election dummies. Additionally, Wald tests reject the hypothesis that the effects for Portuguese
municipalities are equal to zero.
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our estimations for total revenue and expenditure PFEs do not provide empirical support
for Hypothesis 3. Larger win margins in the previous elections seem to be associated
with the overestimation of revenues and expenditures by French departments. While the
result for expenditures is consistent with Hypothesis 4, the opposite sign was expected
for revenues. As for Portuguese municipalities, Wald tests do not reject the hypothesis
that the effect is zero, for both revenues and expenditures. That is, there is very little
support for Hypothesis 4.
Regarding the other explanatory variables, Majority, Run for reelection, Terms in Of-
fice, and Government party, are generally insignificant, providing no evidence of fragmen-
tation, lame duck, experience, or party similarity effects. Unemployment rates, regional
GDP per capita growth, and crisis years seem to be associated with the overestimation
of revenues. The result for GDPpc growth is a bit strange, as stronger growth is gener-
ally associated with greater actual revenues, leading to smaller overestimation. Another
constraint that could influence politicians’ behavior in revenue forecasting is the fiscal
pressure. In our study, the variable capturing this effect is Budget stress. It has a positive
and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that greater budget stress leads to more
conservative revenue forecasts.
In the estimations whose results are shown in Table 5, we account for the possibility
that Hypotheses 1 and 2 are interrelated, and effects vary with the values of the elec-
tion dummies and fiscal autonomy. We do this by including interaction terms between
the election dummies and fiscal autonomy, for French departments (FR is a dummy for
France) and Portuguese municipalities. Fiscal autonomy only seems to matter for French
departments. In non-election years, greater fiscal autonomy is associated with more con-
servative revenue forecasts, but in the election year and in the year before the opposite is
true. For Portuguese municipalities, the interaction terms are not statistically significant,
and a Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that the effect of fiscal autonomy is zero.
These results are consistent with those of Table 4, where we only found evidence of effects
of fiscal autonomy for French departments.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
In order to check what lies behind these results for total revenues and expenditures, we
also undertake estimations for their main components. We use the economic classification
of revenues and expenditures. Although there is data on the functional classification of
expenditures for French departments, for Portuguese municipalities there is data only on
the economic classification. The results for current and capital revenue PFEs are shown,
respectively, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. In column (3), we show the results for
revenues from direct taxes, an important component of current revenue, and the major
source of local taxes. Finally, the results for current and capital expenditures are reported,
respectively, in columns (4) and (5).
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[Insert Table 6 about here]
Electoral manipulations of current revenue forecasts seem to drive those for total
revenue, as the results of column (1) of Table 6 are very similar to those of column (1) of
Table 4. That is, French departments make conservative forecasts prior to elections, while
Portuguese municipalities overestimate current revenues. Essentially the same happens
with forecasts of direct taxes (column 3), which are an important component of current
revenues. Electoral manipulation of capital revenue forecasts does not seem to happen in
French departments, as the election dummies are not statistically significant. In the case
of Portuguese municipalities, there is evidence of opportunistic overestimation of capital
revenues in the year before the elections. Concerning current and capital expenditure
forecasts, both are electorally manipulated, and their results are essentially in line with
those found for total expenditure forecasts (column 2 of Table 4).
Concerning the other Hypotheses, fiscal autonomy is associated with conservative fore-
casts for current revenue and current and capital expenditure in French departments (as
postulated in Hypothesis 1), while the effect is essentially zero in Portuguese municipal-
ities for those three components. Regarding capital revenue, greater fiscal autonomy in
Portuguese municipalities is associated with more optimistic forecasts. Political ideol-
ogy and the win margin do not seem to robustly affect forecast errors of revenue and
expenditure components, thus providing no support for Hypotheses 3 and 4.
3.4.4 Robustness tests
The robustness of our results was checked in several ways. First, two alternative sample
periods were used: a common time period (2004-2015) for both countries (see columns
(1) and (2) of Table C.5 in the Online Appendix); and exclusion of 2015 (see columns (3)
and (4)). The latter restriction leads to the exclusion of the 2015 departmental elections
in France, for which electoral rules were different from those of previous elections. For
both alternative sample periods, the results are very similar to those of Table 4.
Second, we estimated separate models for French departments and for Portuguese
municipalities (see Table C.6). Again, the main results are similar to those of Table 4,
with pre-electoral underestimation of revenues in France and overestimation in Portugal.
One drawback of this separate estimation is that we need to exclude year dummies, since
these would be collinear with the election dummies (all French departments have elections
in the same year and all Portuguese municipalities have elections in the same day). Now,
the election dummies, not also capture electoral effects, but also the effects of events which
happened in those years and are common to all localities. This identification problem was
avoided in the common sample, as elections in France and Portugal occurred in different
years.
Third, we estimated separate models for French departments and for Portuguese mu-
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nicipalities, excluding the last local elections in each country. As mentioned above, the
exclusion of the 2015 departmental elections in France avoids the potential problem of in-
cluding an election with different electoral rules. As shown in Table C.5 for the combined
sample, the results for French departments, reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table C.7,
remain practically the same. The exclusion of the 2013 elections in Portugal, and of all
years after the 2009 elections, takes into account the fact that there were changes in fiscal
rules in 2012 and 2013 which limited the mayors’ incentives to overestimate revenues.
Concretely, Law n. 8/2012, regulating commitments and arrears, established that public
entities cannot commit to expenditure if they do not have available funds. Given this
restriction, we expect that the evidence for opportunistic overestimation of revenues is
stronger for a sample that only includes years before this law entered into force. This
is exactly what happens, since the election year dummy is highly statistically significant
in column (3) of Table C.7, while it was only marginally significant in column (3) of
Table C.6. Additionally, the magnitude of the effect is almost three times greater in this
restricted sample (-7.52 against -2.63).
Finally, we checked if the results were sensitive to the use of some alternative ex-
planatory variables. In column (1), we defined fiscal autonomy as the share of total taxes
(rather than just direct taxes) in total revenues. Then, in column (2), we used an ideology
variable which takes the value of one for left-wing presidents/mayors, the value of two
for center or independent, and equals three for right-wing incumbents. In column (3), we
used the share of votes the incumbent’s party obtained in the previous elections, instead
of the win margin. Finally, in column (4), we replaced the dummy for when the party
of the president/mayor holds a majority with the number of coalition parties in govern-
ment (which is one, in case of a single-party government). Our main results concerning
the electoral bias in budget forecasts remain practically unchanged in the estimations of
Table C.8.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we tested four hypotheses based on the existing literature about the political
economy of budget forecast errors, using a panel dataset for 95 French metropolitan
departments and 308 Portuguese municipalities. In a first step of the empirical analysis,
we characterized the statistical properties of budget forecast errors of local governments
in each country, and found that budget forecasts are biased and inefficient both in French
departments and in Portuguese municipalities, with greater biases for the latter. Then,
we proceeded to the analysis of the political, institutional, economic and demographic
determinants of these biases.
The results of system-GMM estimations suggest that local budgets are affected by
electoral motives, thus providing some support for Hypothesis 1, which suggests that lo-
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cal governments opportunistically underestimate expenditure and overestimate revenue
for election years. Concretely, we found that French departments underestimate expen-
ditures in pre-election years. Since departmental elections take place in the first quarter
of the election year, it makes sense that the strongest evidence of opportunistic manip-
ulation of budget forecasts is found for the year before the elections. But, contrary to
Hypothesis 1, revenue forecasts in French departments are mainly conservative. Regarding
Portuguese municipalities, there is opportunistic overestimation of revenues (total, cur-
rent, and from direct taxes), both in the election year and the year before. Although there
is some tendency for overestimation of expenditures, this happens essentially in the year
before elections. In the election year, which is the one that matters most for Portuguese
municipalities (elections occur in the last quarter), the weak evidence of overestimation is
due to capital expenditures, which represents only about 25% of total expenditures, while
there is no evidence of election year bias in current expenditure forecasts.
Overall, the evidence of opportunistic budget forecasting is stronger in Portugal, which
is consistent with the greater margin of maneuver that mayors enjoy when compared to
French departmental presidents. Portuguese mayors generally enjoy the support of ma-
jorities in both the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly, making budget approval
relatively easy, while French departmental presidents usually need to negotiate budget
proposals with opposition parties. Additionally, operating in a system resembling presi-
dentialism, mayors play a more prominent role in their governments than departmental
presidents, who operate in a system comparable to majoritarian parliamentarism. Greater
opportunism in Portuguese municipalities may also result from the fact that most of them
are highly dependent on central government transfers. Therefore, voters may not fully in-
ternalize the costs of the budget deficits which result from the opportunistic management
of budget forecasts, and actually tend to reward opportunism at the polls (see Aidt et al.,
2011, and Veiga and Veiga, 2007). Concerning the other hypotheses, our results suggest
that, in French departments, greater reliance on local direct taxes leads to conservatism
bias in the budget forecasting (Hypothesis 2), and there is little or no evidence regarding
partisan effects (Hypothesis 3) or of strategic budgeting (Hypothesis 4).
Besides contributing to the literature by analyzing the determinants of budget fore-
cast errors in a comparative perspective, involving French departments and Portuguese
municipalities, this paper shows that electoral motives and institutional differences across
countries help explain forecast biases. More concretely, we learn from this paper’s results
that opportunistic management of budget forecasts is more likely to happen when it is
easier for local governments to approve their budgets without much need of negotiation
with opposition parties, as is the case in the vast majority of Portuguese municipalities.
Given the incentives to implement opportunistic policies, in the absence of strict fiscal
rules, more political room of maneuver will likely result in more opportunism. This could
be counteracted by changing the electoral system in a way that led to a smaller number of
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majorities (as happens in French departments) or, perhaps more effectively, by tightening
fiscal rules. Not allowing commitments for expenditures if the required revenues are not
guaranteed, as done in Portugal during the Economic Adjustment Program funded by the
EU and the IMF, is one possibility. Alternatively, one could penalize local governments
that clearly overestimate revenues, or set more effective balanced budget rules, coupled
with severe restrictions to the accumulation of debt. Our results also suggest that increas-
ing the degree of fiscal autonomy of local governments, therefore reducing their reliance
on central government transfers, would lead to more conservative budget forecasts.
Finally, having identified a number of instances of budget forecast cycles, future re-
search could look at the electoral consequences of these budget forecast manipulations.
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Bias test
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Forecast Performance Indicators
French Departments Portuguese Municipalities
(2004-2015) (1998-2015)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Percent Forecast Errors (PFE)
PFE-Total Revenue 1045 -3.26 6.29 4496 -56.73 46.77
PFE-Current Revenue 1045 3.2 2.97 4496 -14.09 24.95
PFE-Capital Revenue 1045 -41.35 38.99 4496 -191.37 254.17
PFE-Direct taxes 1045 1.47 5.57 4496 -5.4 36.38
PFE-Total Expenditure 1045 -3.83 5.95 4496 -54.5 45
PFE-Current Expenditure 1045 -1.18 2.94 4496 -16.38 25.61
PFE-Capital Expenditure 1045 -15.65 24.35 4496 -114.75 104.81
Absolute Percent Forecast Errors (APFE)
APFE-Total Revenue 1045 5.38 4.6 4496 57.1 46.32
APFE-Current Revenue 1045 3.52 2.59 4496 16.85 23.18
APFE-Capital Revenue 1045 48.15 30.17 4496 192.15 253.58
APFE-Direct taxes 1045 3 4.91 4496 20.32 30.66
APFE-Total Expenditure 1045 5.4 4.57 4496 55.18 44.16
APFE-Current Expenditure 1045 2.36 2.11 4496 18.75 23.93
APFE-Capital Expenditure 1045 20.55 20.38 4496 116.1 103.32
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Efficiency test
Table 2: Efficiency test (Revenue)
French departments Portuguese municipalities
Total Current Capital Direct Total Current Capital Direct
Revenue Revenue Revenue Taxes Revenue Revenue Revenue Taxes
PFE_lag2 0.0462 -0.0250 -0.0880** -0.130*** 0.0562*** 0.0675* 0.139*** 0.0674**
(0.0431) (0.0461) (0.0357) (0.0285) (0.0173) (0.0346) (0.0512) (0.0287)
Forecast -22.13* -13.54*** -7.606** -14.76*** -123.3*** -58.01*** -74.81*** -52.99***
(11.27) (5.098) (3.318) (4.512) (4.402) (5.576) (6.220) (5.517)
Constant 188.0* 117.8*** 4.940 110.8*** 1472.5*** 666.2*** 691.2*** 520.4***
(97.35) (43.28) (21.90) (33.36) (54.11) (64.97) (74.23) (54.71)
Observations 950 950 950 950 4162 3908 3908 3907
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.129 0.020 0.117 0.612 0.377 0.055 0.233
Fixed effects estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<.1, ** p<.05,
*** p<.01
Table 3: Efficiency test (Expenditure)
French departments Portuguese municipalities
Total Current Capital Total Current Capital
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
PFE_lag2 0.144*** -0.0173 0.231*** 0.0655** 0.0769 0.0599**
(0.0540) (0.0293) (0.0689) (0.0283) (0.0521) (0.0276)
Forecast -20.87** -5.235*** 25.98*** -94.44*** -50.05*** -89.40***
(9.478) (1.277) (6.872) (6.537) (6.195) (3.946)
Constant 176.9** 42.47*** -202.0*** 1122.8*** 566.0*** 942.5***
(81.91) (10.67) (49.44) (80.60) (71.53) (46.69)
Observations 950 950 950 3908 3908 3907
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.044 0.050 0.462 0.329 0.237




Table 4: Determinants of PFE - Totals (Combined Sample)
(1) (2)
Total Revenue Total Expenditure
PFE_lag1 0.40*** 0.41***
(0.064) (0.072)
Year before elections 14.7*** 14.0***
(2.81) (2.79)
Year before elections*PT -35.5*** -34.1***
(5.13) (5.02)
Election year 3.62 1.01
(2.26) (1.89)
Election year*PT -12.3*** -5.94*
(3.78) (3.50)
Fiscal autonomy 0.79*** 0.84***
(0.18) (0.18)
Fiscal autonomy*PT -0.72*** -0.72***
(0.13) (0.15)
Left wing 4.10 4.40
(3.15) (3.00)
Left wing*PT 1.07 0.70
(3.69) (3.39)
Win margin -0.17*** -0.14**
(0.063) (0.056)




Run for reelection -0.76 -1.58
(2.04) (2.12)
Terms in Office -0.45 -0.58
(0.66) (0.69)
Government party 1.61 2.02*
(1.17) (1.20)
Unemployment rate -1.63** -1.62**
(0.67) (0.71)




Population growth 0.20 0.15
(0.57) (0.44)




AR(1) P-val 0.000 0.000
AR(2) P-val 0.310 0.928
Hansen P-val 0.299 0.330
Notes: System-GMM estimations. All variables, except the dummies related to election years and the year dummies, were
treated as potentially endogenous. Their twice lagged levels were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and
their once lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation (380 instruments). Two-step results using robust standard
errors corrected for finite samples (see Windmeijer, 2005). Significance levels:* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 5: Interactions of election years with fiscal autonomy
(1) (2)
Total Revenue Total Expenditure
Lagged-PFE 0.41*** 0.43***
(0.065) (0.071)
Year before elections*FR 37.7*** 34.7***
(7.29) (7.49)
Year before elections*FR*Fiscal autonomy -0.67*** -0.60***
(0.20) (0.20)
Election year*FR 35.2*** 30.3***
(7.46) (6.51)
Election year*FR*Fiscal autonomy -1.12*** -1.05***
(0.24) (0.21)
Year before elections*PT -21.2*** -18.5***
(3.50) (3.33)
Year before elections*PT*Fiscal autonomy -0.067 -0.14
(0.11) (0.093)
Election year*PT -12.1*** -7.53***
(2.77) (2.74)
Election year*PT*Fiscal autonomy 0.074 0.071
(0.085) (0.084)
Fiscal autonomy 0.58*** 0.63***
(0.16) (0.15)
Fiscal Autonomy*PT -0.64*** -0.66***
(0.13) (0.12)
Left wing 4.40 4.21
(2.88) (2.66)
Left wing *PT 0.15 0.42
(3.38) (3.09)
Win margin -0.12** -0.13***
(0.056) (0.049)




Run for reelection -0.42 -1.06
(1.99) (1.86)
Terms in Office -0.31 -0.14
(0.68) (0.65)
Government party 1.82 2.00*
(1.17) (1.19)
Unemployment rate -1.14* -1.13*
(0.65) (0.66)




Population growth 0.52 0.43
(0.40) (0.35)
Budget stress 0.78*** 0.70***
(0.18) (0.19)
Observations 5541 5541
AR(1) P-val 0.000 0.000
AR(2) P-val 0.297 0.797
Hansen P-val 0.177 0.179
Notes: System-GMM estimations in which all variables, except the dummies related to election years and the year dummies,
were treated as potentially endogenous. Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (see
Windmeijer, 2005). Significance levels:* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 6: Determinants of PFE - Components (Combined Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Current Capital Direct Current Capital
Revenue Revenue Taxes Expenditure Expenditure
PFE_lag1 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.16*** 0.17** 0.41***
(0.100) (0.080) (0.055) (0.068) (0.058)
Year before elections 8.66*** 9.52 8.04*** 6.42*** 43.5***
(1.73) (15.5) (2.11) (1.29) (7.52)
Year before elections*PT -18.5*** -59.0** -25.8*** -16.9*** -93.2***
(3.06) (26.6) (4.59) (2.68) (14.0)
Election year 4.94*** -15.7 4.47* 1.53 1.59
(1.14) (20.9) (2.32) (1.05) (5.44)
Election year*PT -5.83*** -10.9 -16.4*** 0.79 -20.1**
(1.77) (27.4) (3.36) (2.03) (9.38)
Fiscal autonomy 0.23*** 0.79 0.050 0.24*** 1.46***
(0.070) (1.11) (0.12) (0.078) (0.40)
Fiscal autonomy*PT -0.18** -4.44*** 0.16 -0.44*** -1.34***
(0.073) (0.84) (0.10) (0.086) (0.32)
Left wing 0.54 28.4* 0.41 3.18* 13.3*
(1.72) (16.4) (2.26) (1.63) (7.55)
Left wing*PT -0.64 -3.64 -0.81 -1.90 -5.24
(1.89) (19.4) (2.97) (2.24) (9.26)
Win margin -0.0096 -0.12 0.017 -0.0067 -0.45***
(0.025) (0.21) (0.041) (0.028) (0.15)
Win margin*PT -0.020 0.85 -0.11 -0.075 0.89***
(0.056) (0.80) (0.11) (0.067) (0.27)
Majority 0.97 -22.9 -0.37 0.47 6.73
(1.92) (29.0) (3.00) (2.30) (8.02)
Run for reelection -1.98* 22.7** 0.43 -0.84 -0.53
(1.18) (11.1) (1.57) (1.30) (5.25)
Terms in Office -0.66 2.09 0.066 0.49 -2.97*
(0.40) (5.06) (0.56) (0.46) (1.71)
Government party 0.48 3.10 -1.95* 1.57** 2.04
(0.66) (5.83) (1.14) (0.74) (2.74)
Unemployment rate -0.95** -19.9** -2.04*** -1.35*** -3.51**
(0.40) (7.74) (0.59) (0.44) (1.57)
Regional GDP per capita growth -0.66*** -5.00** -1.22*** -0.54*** -1.22
(0.17) (2.11) (0.46) (0.16) (0.85)
Crisis -7.76*** -5.38 -4.08** -8.09*** -24.1***
(1.31) (7.93) (1.66) (1.28) (4.56)
Population growth -0.27 4.41 -0.39 0.050 0.40
(0.21) (4.37) (0.37) (0.21) (1.36)
Budget stress 0.13 3.84 0.71*** -0.049 2.35***
(0.12) (2.72) (0.15) (0.13) (0.40)
Observations 5541 5541 5541 5541 5541
R-squared
AR(1) P-val 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000
AR(2) P-val 0.784 0.521 0.179 0.628 0.411
Hansen P-val 0.426 0.474 0.358 0.329 0.385
Notes: System-GMM estimations in which all variables, except the dummies related to election years and the year dummies,
were treated as potentially endogenous. Their twice lagged levels were used as instruments in the first-difference equations
and their once lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation. Two-step results using robust standard errors




Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of independent variables(French departments)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year before elections 1045 .18 .39 0 1
Election year 1045 .27 .45 0 1
Fiscal autonomy (Share of Direct Taxes in T.Revenue) 1045 30.72 5.12 12.19 51.27
Fiscal autonomy 2 (Share of Total Taxes in T.Revenue) 1045 56.01 7.45 27.28 90.54
Left wing 1045 .53 .5 0 1
Right wing president 1045 .42 .49 0 1
Centre president 1045 .05 .23 0 1
Ideology (Left=1; Center/Independent=2; Right=3) 1045 1.89 .97 1 3
Win margin (previous election) 1045 4.33 15.68 -43.93 75.78
Share of votes of the incumbent’s party (prev. election) 1045 27.33 15.67 0 65.51
Majority 1045 .05 .22 0 1
Number of coalition parties 1045 2.76 .81 1 6
Terms in Office 1045 1.37 1.2 0 10
Government party 1045 .43 .5 0 1
Run for reelection 1045 .76 .43 0 1
Unemployment rate 1045 8.91 1.88 4.2 16
Regional GDP per capita growth 1045 2.21 2.57 -5.58 7.69
Population growth 1045 .68 .95 -1.4 6.31
Budget stress 1045 -.34 3.04 -16.95 17.45
Crisis 1045 .09 .29 0 1
Population 1045 639673.1 468917.9 76800 2627956
Population density (inhabitants per km2) 1045 333.3 1203.82 14.2 9033.85
Regional GDP per capita 1045 28384.05 6568.41 21685.21 53416.33
Total revenue per capita 1045 1053.93 184.29 264.06 1879.17
Current revenue per capita 1045 936.66 160.56 250.65 1587.69
Capital revenue per capita 1045 117.47 71.53 13.41 622.77
Direct taxes per capita 1045 318.8 55.95 63.27 598.67
Total expenditure per capita 1045 1051.79 182.37 273.86 1803.92
Current expenditure per capita 1045 804.61 152.69 235.06 1317.75
Capital expenditure per capita 1045 247.17 83.73 38.8 666.64
Sources: French Directorate General of Local Governments and Ministry of Internal Affairs.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables (Portuguese municipalities)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year before elections 4496 .26 .44 0 1
Election year 4496 .26 .44 0 1
Fiscal autonomy (Share of Direct Taxes in T.Revenue) 4496 17.44 13.7 .11 68.38
Fiscal autonomy 2 (Share of Total Taxes in T.Revenue) 4496 18.8 15.04 .11 75.74
Left wing 4496 .53 .5 0 1
Right-wing mayor (PPD-PSD or CDS-PP) 4496 .45 .5 0 1
Independent mayor (Group of Citizens) 4496 .02 .14 0 1
Ideology (Left=1; Center/Independent=2; Right=3) 4496 1.93 .99 1 3
Win margin (previous election) 4496 19.94 14.11 .02 75.75
Share of votes of the incumbent’s party (prev. election) 4485 51.54 9.21 7.22 83.12
Majority 4496 .81 .39 0 1
Number of coalition parties 4496 1.06 .27 1 4
Run for reelection 4496 .75 .43 0 1
Terms in Office 4496 2.5 1.75 0 10
Government party 4496 .42 .49 0 1
Unemployment rate 4496 6.71 2.83 .64 18.29
Regional GDP per capita growth 4496 .85 3.73 -15.65 14.84
Population growth 4496 -.29 2.13 -21.56 24.98
Budget stress 4496 -1.03 10.45 -68.36 40.26
Crisis 4496 .32 .47 0 1
Population 4496 34346.52 55312.08 430 580436
Population density (inhabitants per km2) 4496 296.29 809.56 4.3 7535.72
Regional GDP per capita 3950 14847.29 3412.34 9129.65 26169.33
Total revenue minus loans (effective revenue) per capita 4496 903.61 489.25 255.55 7500.72
Current revenue per capita 4496 619.4 321.87 173.43 3075.86
Capital revenue minus loans per capita 4496 285.87 248.48 2.07 5230.39
Direct taxes per capita 4496 128.37 107.58 4.31 1251.59
Total expenditure per capita 4496 969.84 540.37 284.71 7883.85
Current expenditure per capita 4496 566.78 319.81 116.79 2546.89
Capital expenditure per capita 4496 259.31 216.29 3.26 2165.28
Personnel expenditure per capita 4496 273.41 170.65 39.4 1582.62
Sources: Portuguese Directorate General of Local Authorities (DGAL), Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MAI), and National Institute of Statistics (INE).
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B VIF Tests and Correlation Matrix
Table B.3: Results of VIF test
Variables VIF
Year before elections 7.90










Run for reelection 1.14
Terms in Office 1.22
Government party 1.06
Unemployment rate 1.23






Table B.4: Correlations among explanatory variables
Year Election Win Financial Left Majority Run Terms Government Unemployment Regional Crisis Population Budget
before year margin autonomy Wing for in party rate GDPpc growth stress
elections reelection Office growth
Year before elections 1.000
Election year -0.293 1.000
Win margin 0.027 -0.057 1.000
Fiscal autonomy -0.016 0.017 -0.188 1.000
Left wing -0.009 -0.018 -0.057 0.049 1.000
Majority 0.032 -0.059 0.490 -0.279 -0.011 1.000
Run for reelection -0.012 0.001 -0.023 -0.001 0.024 -0.032 1.000
Terms in Office 0.047 -0.026 0.297 -0.101 0.018 0.289 -0.242 1.000
Government party 0.021 -0.021 -0.014 0.001 -0.094 0.000 -0.017 -0.027 1.000
Unemployment rate -0.075 0.037 -0.147 0.183 0.168 -0.207 -0.057 -0.110 -0.048 1.000
Regional GDPpc growth -0.130 -0.172 -0.095 -0.054 -0.011 -0.059 0.164 -0.094 -0.034 -0.145 1.000
Crisis -0.034 0.258 0.096 -0.066 -0.014 0.118 -0.182 0.115 0.030 0.053 -0.463 1.000
Population growth -0.022 0.103 -0.069 0.314 0.021 -0.102 0.052 -0.025 -0.003 -0.034 0.139 -0.104 1.000
Budget stress 0.050 0.047 -0.028 0.070 0.029 -0.034 -0.043 -0.035 -0.015 0.126 -0.116 0.090 -0.046 1.000
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C Robustness Tests
Table C.5: Alternative sample periods
Common period (2014-2015) Before 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Revenue Total Expenditure Total Revenue Total Expenditure
PFE_lag1 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.37*** 0.38***
(0.057) (0.081) (0.064) (0.077)
Year before elections 11.4*** 12.0*** 13.4*** 12.6***
(2.47) (2.84) (2.62) (2.75)
Year before elections*PT -27.2*** -27.4*** -29.7*** -28.2***
(4.66) (4.75) (4.80) (4.75)
Election year 3.10 0.018 11.7*** 8.09***
(2.27) (2.00) (2.79) (2.45)
Election year*PT -9.12** -1.86 -19.0*** -11.6***
(3.73) (3.68) (4.02) (3.61)
Financial autonomy 0.49** 0.48** 0.97*** 0.98***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Financial autonomy*PT -0.60*** -0.61*** -0.90*** -0.87***
(0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
Left wing 1.93 2.49 0.40 1.54
(2.32) (2.28) (3.49) (3.24)
Left wing*PT 2.73 2.18 5.26 4.02
(3.28) (3.15) (4.29) (3.92)
Win margin -0.078* -0.073* -0.12** -0.11**
(0.044) (0.040) (0.055) (0.051)
Win margin*PT 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Majority 1.54 -1.29 2.15 1.33
(3.81) (3.46) (3.80) (3.68)
Run for reelection -2.21 -3.08 -1.80 -2.30
(1.90) (1.93) (2.37) (2.27)
Terms in Office -0.99* -0.80 -0.48 -0.78
(0.59) (0.60) (0.75) (0.74)
Government party 2.30* 2.58* 1.31 1.59
(1.35) (1.40) (1.30) (1.22)
Unemployment rate -0.66 -0.41 -1.92** -1.87**
(0.63) (0.69) (0.75) (0.80)
Regional GDP per capita growth -0.54 -0.45 -1.20*** -1.14***
(0.34) (0.29) (0.36) (0.34)
Crisis -8.60*** -9.13*** -11.1*** -11.3***
(1.86) (1.91) (1.82) (1.92)
Population growth -0.073 -0.22 0.089 0.065
(0.59) (0.43) (0.56) (0.44)
Budget stress 1.14*** 1.04*** 0.62*** 0.59***
(0.17) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22)
Observations 4286 4286 5143 5143
AR(1) P-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) P-val 0.090 0.188 0.337 0.962
Hansen P-val 0.180 0.269 0.110 0.125
Notes: System-GMM estimations in which all variables, except the dummies related to election years and the year dummies,
were treated as potentially endogenous. Their twice lagged levels were used as instruments in the first-difference equations
and their once lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation. Two-step results using robust standard errors
corrected for finite samples (see Windmeijer, 2005). Significance levels:* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table C.6: Separate country samples
French departments Portuguese municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Revenue Total Expenditure Total Revenue Total Expenditure
PFE_lag1 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.50***
(0.11) (0.073) (0.066) (0.076)
Year before elections 3.01*** 2.47*** -8.63*** -8.39***
(1.06) (0.85) (1.72) (1.66)
Election year 1.40** -0.51 -2.63* -1.15
(0.63) (0.65) (1.58) (1.65)
Fiscal autonomy -0.52*** -0.57*** 0.14 0.18
(0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Left wing 2.73* 0.97 2.36 2.24
(1.38) (1.17) (2.11) (2.27)
Win margin -0.0035 -0.016 -0.0016 0.0044
(0.022) (0.018) (0.11) (0.11)
Majority -0.33 0.87 4.43 4.18
(1.74) (1.60) (3.82) (3.98)
Run for reelection 0.81 0.59 7.04*** 7.84***
(0.66) (0.57) (2.61) (2.60)
Terms in Office -0.33 -0.21 0.73 1.21
(0.42) (0.32) (0.77) (0.78)
Government party 0.68 0.091 2.22 2.63*
(0.62) (0.55) (1.64) (1.54)
Unemployment rate -1.58*** -1.44*** 1.58** 0.99
(0.27) (0.24) (0.64) (0.69)
Regional GDP per capita growth -0.14 -0.11 -0.75** -0.68**
(0.11) (0.094) (0.30) (0.28)
Crisis 8.64** 6.60** -5.77*** -5.52***
(3.37) (2.67) (1.76) (1.55)
Population growth -3.92*** -2.12** -0.69 -0.32
(1.18) (0.98) (0.86) (0.82)
Budget stress -0.075 -0.14 0.99*** 1.23***
(0.31) (0.14) (0.19) (0.20)
Observations 950 950 3942 3942
AR(1) P-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) P-val 0.545 0.852 0.470 0.520
Hansen P-val 0.233 0.189 0.211 0.198
Notes: System-GMM estimations in which all variables, except the dummies related to election years and the year dummies,
were treated as potentially endogenous. Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (see
Windmeijer, 2005). Significance levels:* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table C.7: Separate country samples, with alternative time periods
French departments Portuguese municipalities
Excluding the 2015 elections Excluding the 2013 elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Revenue Total Expenditure Total Revenue Total Expenditure
PFE_lag1 0.37*** 0.43*** 0.29*** 0.30***
(0.13) (0.078) (0.078) (0.089)
Year before elections 1.66** 1.01** -8.60*** -7.60***
(0.64) (0.50) (1.83) (1.91)
Election year 2.13*** 0.11 -7.52*** -6.67***
(0.67) (0.62) (1.66) (1.74)
Fiscal autonomy -0.33*** -0.38*** 0.28** 0.35**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14)
Left wing 1.06 1.26 7.64** 8.00**
(1.66) (1.85) (3.36) (3.30)
Win margin -0.0077 -0.023 0.035 -0.0092
(0.017) (0.015) (0.16) (0.14)
Majority -0.022 -1.60 3.68 5.06
(1.40) (1.62) (5.22) (4.84)
Run for reelection 0.024 0.26 1.69 2.54
(0.64) (0.61) (4.52) (3.82)
Terms in Office -0.64 -0.40 3.15*** 1.89*
(0.46) (0.33) (1.11) (1.10)
Government party -0.14 -0.58 -0.22 0.70
(0.73) (0.81) (1.83) (1.84)
Unemployment rate -1.41*** -1.44*** -3.32*** -3.60***
(0.25) (0.24) (0.78) (0.71)
Regional GDP per capita growth -0.021 -0.10 -1.63*** -1.51***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.42) (0.40)
Crisis 2.78* 1.77 -7.39*** -5.21***
(1.60) (1.57) (1.95) (1.89)
Population growth -2.06*** -0.55 -1.33 -1.69*
(0.61) (0.56) (0.94) (0.93)
Budget stress 0.073 -0.30*** 0.47* 0.43*
(0.27) (0.11) (0.25) (0.24)
Observations 950 950 2668 2668
AR(1) P-val 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003
AR(2) P-val 0.241 0.032 0.523 0.111
Hansen P-val 0.213 0.152 0.232 0.135
Notes: System-GMM estimations in which all variables, except the dummies related to election years and the year dummies,
were treated as potentially endogenous. Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (see
Windmeijer, 2005). Significance levels:* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table C.8: Alternative political variables - Results for Total Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fiscal autonomy 2 Ideology Share of votes Coalition members
PFE_lag1 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.40***
(0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064)
Year before elections 18.2*** 14.8*** 14.8*** 14.4***
(2.80) (2.78) (2.72) (2.73)
Year before elections*PT -40.6*** -35.6*** -35.5*** -35.9***
(5.22) (5.11) (5.02) (5.30)
Election year 3.10 2.92 2.10 4.34**
(2.15) (2.24) (2.25) (2.16)
Election year*PT -16.0*** -11.8*** -12.3*** -13.1***
(3.60) (3.58) (3.69) (3.65)
Financial autonomy 0.67*** 0.41 0.96***
(0.19) (0.25) (0.19)
Fiscal autonomy*PT -0.60*** -0.40* -0.86***
(0.16) (0.22) (0.14)




Left wing 6.44** 3.06 3.39
(3.04) (2.67) (2.94)
Left wing*PT -1.86 2.07 1.21
(3.59) (3.37) (3.54)




Win margin -0.14** -0.16*** -0.17***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.059)
Win margin*PT 0.16 0.19* 0.23**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Share of votes of the incumbent’s party (previous election) 0.022
(0.056)
Share of votes of the incumbent’s party*PT -0.26*
(0.14)
Majority 0.72 3.09 6.28*
(3.09) (3.18) (3.22)
Number of coalition parties -3.88**
(1.56)
Run for reelection -1.63 -0.46 -0.79 -0.55
(2.13) (2.09) (2.06) (2.06)
Terms in Office -0.61 -0.46 -0.35 -0.29
(0.69) (0.69) (0.67) (0.67)
Government party 1.73 1.36 1.91 1.67
(1.21) (1.17) (1.22) (1.16)
Unemployment rate -1.55** -1.66** -1.60** -1.60**
(0.64) (0.67) (0.66) (0.68)
Regional GDP per capita growth -1.24*** -1.12*** -1.15*** -1.21***
(0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.36)
Crisis -9.24*** -10.5*** -8.98*** -11.7***
(1.73) (1.93) (1.94) (1.88)
Population growth 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.19
(0.57) (0.58) (0.56) (0.60)
Budget stress 0.80*** 0.78*** 0.80*** 0.73***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19)
Observations 5541 5541 5530 5541
AR(1) P-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) P-val 0.288 0.324 0.319 0.268
Hansen P-val 0.336 0.311 0.339 0.346
Notes: System-GMM estimations in which all variables, except the dummies related to election years and the year dummies,
were treated as potentially endogenous. Their twice lagged levels were used as instruments in the first-difference equations
and their once lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation. Two-step results using robust standard errors
corrected for finite samples (see Windmeijer, 2005). Significance levels:* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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